Mechanism Design

Full Papers

Session: Track 2b: Mechanism Design
Date/Time: Wednesday, May 16 / 3:00 p.m. – 4:00 p.m.
Location: Room 313B HCC
Chair(s): Peter Stone

Coalition Formation under Uncertainty: Bargaining Equilibria and the Bayesian Core Stability Concept
Georgios Chalkiadakis, Evangelos Markakis, and Craig Boutilier

Eliciting Single-Peaked Preferences Using Comparison Queries
Vincent Conitzer

On the Robustness of Preference Aggregation in Noisy Environments
Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein and Gal A. Kaminka



Session: Track 2c: Mechanism Design
Date/Time: Wednesday, May 16 / 4:30 p.m. – 5:30 p.m.
Location: Room 313B HCC
Chair(s): Nick Jennings

Constraint Satisfaction Algorithms for Graphical Games
Vishal Soni, Satinder Singh and Michael P. Wellman

Factoring Games to Isolate Strategic Interactions
George B. Davis, Michael Benisch, Kathleen M. Carley and Norman M. Sadeh

Sequential Decision Making in Parallel Two-Sided Economic Search
David Sarne and Teijo Arponen

Poster Paper


Requirement Driven Agent Collaboration
Liwei Zheng and Zhi Jin

ISBN: 978-81-904262-7-5 (RPS)                                                                                                      © 2007 IFAAMAS