Mechanism Design and Game Theory

Full Papers

Session: Track 2f: Mechanism Design and Game Theory
Date/Time: Friday, May 18 / 10:30 a.m. – 12:00 p.m.
Location: Room 313B HCC
Chair(s): Tuomas Sandholm

A Computational Characterization of Multiagent Games with Fallacious Rewards
Ariel D. Procaccia and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

A Near-Optimal Strategy for a Heads-Up No-Limit Texas Hold'em Poker Tournamet
Peter Bro Miltersen and Troels Bjerre Sørensen

Better Automated Abstraction Techniques for Imperfect Information Games, with Application to Texas Hold'em Poker
Andrew Gilpin and Tuomas Sandholm

Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis of the TAC Supply Chain Game
Patrick R. Jordan, Christopher Kiekintveld and Michael P. Wellman

Poster Papers


An Adaptive Strategy for Minority Games
Ka-man Lam and Ho-fung Leung

Routing Games with an Unknown Set of Active Players
Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz

Requirement Driven Agent Collaboration
Liwei Zheng and Zhi Jin

Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees Based on Cardinality Structure
She-Xiong Su, Shan-Li Hu and Chun-Yi Shi

Some Results on Approximating the Minimax Solution in Approval Voting
Rob LeGrand, Evangelos Markakis and Aranyak Mehta

ISBN: 978-81-904262-7-5 (RPS)                                                                                                      © 2007 IFAAMAS